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The Multilateral Agreement on
Investment
Stephen J. Canner*
Introduction
On May 25, 1995, Ministers of the Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD) launched a negotiation for a Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI). The statement by the Ministers identified
three major pillars: a broad multilateral framework of rules for investor
protection, the liberalization of investment regimes, and effective dispute
settlement procedures. The Ministers also stated that the agreement
should be open to accession by non-OECD countries, and that the agree-
ment was to be concluded by May 1997.1
The purpose of the negotiations was to establish worldwide rules for
investment, similar to the rules for trade within the GATT and WTO. Spe-
cific rules for investment and liberalization of restrictions would promote
competition and economic efficiency across and within markets,
encourage a broader dispersion of technology and capital, and enhance
economic growth and a higher standard of living worldwide. Consumers
would benefit directly from increased quality, wider choice, and lower
prices on goods and services. Producers, who in today's global economy
have no choice but to compete abroad, would benefit from a level playing
field.
By opening the MAI to accession by non-OECD countries, those coun-
tries that have liberalized their investment regimes and welcomed invest-
ment could harmonize with "best practices" and anticipate greater flows of
international investment. In the context of today's Asian financial crisis,
accession to the MAI by Korea (an OECD member), and Singapore and
Hong Kong (non-members who have expressed interest in acceding to the
agreement), would send a powerful message to Asian countries and help
attract long-term capital back to the region.
This paper reviews the objectives of the negotiations for a Multilateral
Agreement on Investment. The paper begins by addressing the question
"Why MAI?" and then summarizes earlier attempts to deal with investment
* The author is Vice President for Investment Policy and Financial Services at the
United States Council for International Business.
1. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), A Multi-
lateral Agreement on Investment: Report by the Committee on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises (CIME) and the Committee on Capital Movements and Invisible
Transactions (CMIT) (May 25, 1995) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cnis/mai/
mairap95.htm>.
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issues in bilateral investment treaties (BITs), 2 OECD Codes, 3 WTO rules,4
and Chapter Eleven of the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 5
The paper then addresses the issue of the appropriate negotiating forum -
OECD or WTO. This discussion is followed by a presentation of the basic
rules that should be incorporated into the MAI. Next, the paper addresses
the controversial issues of how exceptions to the basic MAI rules should be
handled and the recent migration of non-MAI issues (labor and environ-
ment proposals) into the agreement. The paper concludes with a discus-
sion of three critical points: a statement by the United States at the OECD
high level meeting in February 1998 that it views the MAI as unready for
ratification; the results of the ensuing OECD Ministerial in April 1998; and
the author's view of "where we go from here."
I. Why MAI?
A. Globalization
Globalization is not a new phenomenon. However, the surge in globaliza-
tion, particularly in the past ten years, has focused attention on the impor-
tance of international investment. Multinational enterprises know that, to
be competitive, they must function in a global economy in virtually all fac-
ets of their business, including the design, development, production and
sale of goods and services. This often requires that d company establish a
physical presence in, overseas markets so that it can hire local employees,
participate in local research and development consortia, access skills and
technology not available in the home market, and grow close to its custom-
ers. Such a physical presence can only be achieved through direct
investment.
As Larry Bossidy, Chairman and CEO of Allied Signal explained:
To succeed in today's markets ... a company cannot hope to sit back home
in Dubuque making widgets and then export the finished goods to buyers
abroad .... Either through affiliates or joint venture partners you need to be
there, on the ground with local facilities .... To gain a foothold in an over-
seas market, you need to invest.6
The increasing role of technology in global markets places an even higher
premium on the ability of firms to invest across borders. The pace of tech-
nological development has shortened the life cycle of products dramati-
cally, requiring new and more costly investments to deliver the technology
to the production stage. The accelerating cost of technological develop-
ment compels companies to seek business partners from other countries to
develop new technologies. Direct investment provides the vehicle and the
flexibility for firms to achieve these objectives.
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. See infra Part II.C.
5. See infra Part II.D.
6. U.S. COUNCIL FOR INT'L INV., A GUIDE TO THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVEST.
MENT (1996).
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The rapid increase in globalization demands increased international
cooperation for the world economy to maximize the efficient use of the
world's scarce resources. Of course, to achieve the highest standard of liv-
ing, this must be done in a manner consistent with sound environmental
principles.
B. The Rise of International Investment
Globalization, the rapid pace of technological advances, and the liberaliza-
tion of governments' laws and practices have each contributed to the dra-
matic increase in the flow of cross-border investments in the past ten years.
Consider the following:
- In 1985, annual outflows of direct investment were $50 billion a year; in
the next ten years investment flows increased six-fold to $300 billion
per year. By the end of 1996, flows of direct investment were nearly
$350 billion. Some eighty-five percent of these flows are accounted for
by developed countries.7
- Developing countries seeking access to global markets through invest-
ment constitute the remaining fifteen percent, or $50 billion, of direct
investment outflows. This represents a more than six-fold increase from
their 1991 investment flows.8
- There is a widespread trend toward liberalization of investment regimes.
In 1991, thirty-five countries introduced eighty-two changes in their
investment regimes; all but two of these changes were liberalizing. In
1995, nearly twice as many countries introduced 112 changes in their
investment regimes. All but six of these changes were liberalizing.9
- There is substantial evidence that trade and investment are closely
related. As firms invest more abroad, they export more from their home
countries. For example, 1996 merchandise exports from U.S. compa-
nies with global operations were $360 billion, an amount equal to sixty
percent of U.S. exports.10
- Firms with global operations generate financial returns that are impor-
tant for their companies and their economies. It is not unusual today
for a U.S. company to have upwards of fifty percent of its annual reve-
nue produced by sales, profits, royalties, and returns on overseas invest-
ments. In the aggregate, U.S. firms repatriate to the United States more
than fifty percent of the profits of their overseas subsidiaries. 1 '
C. The World's Largest Investors
Who are the world's largest providers and recipients of international invest-
ment? The United States accounts for the largest amount of both invest-
7. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INvESTMENT REPORT, Annex I, II,
U.N. Sales No. 97.II.D.13 (1997) [hereinafter WIR 1997].
8. Id.
9. Id. at 132.
10. See Raymond J. Mataloni, Jr., U.S. Multinational Companies Operations in 1995,
SuRv. oF CuRRENT Bus., Oct. 1997, at 44, 50.
11. See id.
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ment inflows and outflows, which total $84.6 billion and $84.9 billion,
respectively. The United Kingdom and Germany rank a distant second
and third, with outflows in 1996 of $53 billion and $29 billion, respec-
tively. China is the second largest importer of direct investment, with
inflows of $426 billion, followed by the United Kingdom and Germany,
with direct investment inflows of $30 billion and $21 billion, respectively,
in 1996. Among developing countries, Hong Kong, Singapore, China,
Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, and Brazil account for the lion's share of outward
investment flows. 12
II. Early Attempts for International Rules
Prior to launching the MAI negotiations, rules governing international
investment and investors were dispersed throughout a number of bilateral
investment treaties, OECD Codes, regional agreements such as Chapter
Eleven of the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and provi-
sions in World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements (e.g., the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Trade Related Investment
Measures (TRIMS)). However, there was no comprehensive set of rules to
help reduce barriers to investment or to protect the flow of international
investment from arbitrary and discriminatory trade practices.
A. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
BITs, as the name implies, are treaties under which two countries agree to
protect their investments in each other's territory. They embrace tradi-
tional investment treaty concepts such as national treatment, most favored
nation (MFN), transfers of capital, and expropriation of property and pro-
cedures to settle disputes.
The initiative to negotiate investment treaties began with a bilateral
treaty between Germany and Pakistan in 1959. By 1991, Germany led the
world in negotiating investment treaties with seventy-seven, followed by
Switzerland, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. As of
1996, there were some 1600 investment treaties in force worldwide, the
majority being between European and developing countries. 13 The United
States, which did not begin its bilateral investment treaty program until
1982, had concluded forty-one BITs by 1996.14
The quality of these 1600 bilateral treaties varies from country to
country. For example, most BITs provide for national treatment, which
generally prohibits discrimination between domestic and foreign investors,
12. Compiled from tables in WIR 1997, Annex I and II, supra note 7.
13. See U.N. CTR. ON TRANSNAT'L CORPS. AND THE INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, BILAT-
ERAL IvEsTrENT TREATIES, 1959-1991, at 8-10, U.N Doc. ST/CTC/136, U.N. Sales No.
E.92.II.A.16 (1992).
14. Testimony of Alan Larson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Busi-
ness Affairs, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: A Work in Progress, Testimony
before the House International Relations Committee, Sub-Committee on International
Economic Policy and Trade 2 (Mar. 6, 1998) (transcript with author) [hereinafter Larson
Testimony].
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and most favored nation (MFN) treatment, which prohibits discrimination
by a host government among all of its foreign investors. However, many
treaties provide only for a MFN commitment, which permits a host govern-
ment to discriminate equally against all foreign investors compared to
domestic firms.
Many European BITs do not provide for national treatment with regard
to a foreign investor's right to establish in its markets without being subject
to discrimination by the host government. This gives domestic competitors
a protected position in its markets, denies foreign investors a level playing
field, and inhibits competitive forces from generating the highest standard
of living and most efficient use of scarce capital resources. In addition,
European BITs generally do not ban performance requirements such as
export mandates or local content.15
By contrast, the United States has fewer BITs than Europe, but the
scope of treaty coverage is perhaps the most comprehensive of any of the
major industrialized countries. The U.S. BITs provide for national treat-
ment and MFN for the right to establish and operate a entity, a ban on a
large number of performance requirements, transfers of profits and capital
in a hard currency, expropriation provisions consistent with international
law, and state-to-state and investor-to-state dispute settlement procedures.
BITs allow countries to take exceptions to specific provisions for pol-
icy reasons or to conform to existing laws that either limit or ban foreign
ownership. For example, the United States maintains an exception in its
BITs allow it to deny national treatment to foreign investors in several sec-
tors, including atomic energy, licenses for broadcast, subsidies, and grants.
The United States also maintains an exception to national treatment and
MFN in other sectors, such as fisheries, air and maritime transport, and
banking and insurance.16
B. OECD Codes1 7
In the post-war period, international trade and payments were hindered by
high tariffs, quantitative restrictions on imports, and numerous restric-
tions on the convertibility and movement of capital. Formed in 1961, the
OECD agreed to reduce obstacles to trade and to liberalize both inward and
outward capital movements. This undertaking soon became manifest in
two codes adopted in 1961: The Code of Liberalization of Capital Move-
ments and the Code of Liberalization of Current Invisibles. In 1976, mem-
bers drafted and approved a National Treatment Instrument.
The Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements requires OECD
members to commit to a free flow of capital (both inward and outward),
15. See U.N. CTR. ON TRANSNAT'L CORPS. AND THE INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra
note 13, at 8-10.
16. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Prototype Treaty Concerning
the Encouragement of Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Washington, D.C.
17. See generally OECD, INTRODUCTION TO THE OECD CODES OF LIBERALIZATION OF
CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AND CURRENT INVISIBLE OPERATIONS (1995).
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and provides for the right of establishment. The guiding principle of the
Code is non-discrimination.
OECD members are permitted to lodge reservations, exceptions, and
derogations to the Code where full and immediate compliance is not possi-
ble. However, for most types of capital movements, most members also
commit themselves to the "standstill" (no introduction of new restrictions)
and "rollback" (removal of restrictions) provisions.
The Code of Liberalization of Current Invisibles covers a very wide
range of current account operations, including transfers associated with
general business. As with the Code for Capital Movements, members com-
mit themselves to a standstill by not introducing new restrictions, to a
rollback of existing restrictive measures, and to non-discriminatory appli-
cation to all members.
The two Codes have the legal status of an OECD decision, which is
binding on all of its members. However, the Codes do not provide for a
formal dispute settlement mechanism, relying instead on peer pressure
applied through the process of notification, country examinations, and
consultations to ensure compliance.18
The National Treatment Instrument (NTI) commits OECD members to
apply national treatment to a foreign investor that has established invest-
ment. The NTI does not extend to the right of establishment. Unlike the
Codes, the NTI is voluntary and is not considered binding on OECD mem-
bers. However, like the Codes, it includes the practice of country examina-
tions and consultations to encourage countries to eliminate measures that
discriminate against foreign investors.
The OECD Codes provide a useful but incomplete basis for a compre-
hensive agreement on investment. Their major contribution has been to
encourage liberalization over time to the point where virtually all capital
movements are covered and where the number of exceptions lodged by
individual countries have been significantly reduced over the past thirty
years. However, the Codes do not have the backing of a formal dispute
settlement mechanism that would permit governments or investors to seek
redress for alleged violations by any of the OECD members.
C. WTO Instruments: GATS and TRIMS
The multilateral trading rules traditionally have focused on cross border
movement of goods, and, more recently, services. However, as trade and
investment became more integrally related, some GATT rules relating to the
treatment of foreign persons/companies were developed. The primary
emphasis of these rules concerns the impact of restrictions on foreign per-
sons/companies as they relate to trade, rather than with fundamental con-
cerns of investors such as the right of establishment.
18. Id. at 9.
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1. GATS
The inter-relationship between trade and investment is most dearly evident
in GATS. Negotiated as a "new issue" in the Uruguay round, GATS was the
first legally enforceable multilateral agreement covering trade and invest-
ment in the services sector. It was designed to reduce or eliminate govern-
mental discrimination against foreign entities that provide services. Of the
four methods by which a service may be supplied, GATS identifies two that
are of direct interest to investors: the commercial presence of one member
in the territory of another (establishment) and the presence of personnel of
a member in the territory on another member (movement of personnel). 19
In part, the GATS contains several obligations of importance to foreign
investors, including national and most favored nation treatment, restric-
tions on quantitative limitations, prohibitions on certain transfers and pay-
ments, and transparency requirements to publish government rules
regarding trade in services.
However, the structure of the GATS and the nature of many of its obli-
gations do not fully address investors' concerns. For example, some rules,
such as those providing for national treatment, do not involve principles of
general application (the "top-down" approach), but apply only to those sec-
tors that are specifically listed (the "bottom-up" approach). Even in the
bottom-up approach, national treatment may be only conditionally or par-
tially granted.
The GATS also lacks many important protections found in bilateral
investment agreements: GATS does not contain an absolute ban on per-
formance requirements; no provision is made to ensure that investors and
their investments are provided fair and equitable treatment under interna-
tional law; and there is no provision for investor compensation.
2. Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)
In discussions leading up to the launching of the Uruguay Round, the
United States sought to establish broad, comprehensive rules for invest-
ment, reflecting in large part the provisions of its BITs. However, the
United States faced strong opposition from developing countries that
opposed a broad-based discussion of investment in the trade negotiating
forum of the GATT. As a result, negotiators eventually cast aside any
notions of broad investment disciplines and agreed to discuss only invest-
ment as it related to trade.
The agreement that emerged is designed to ensure that governments
do not implement policies that would create trade restrictions or distor-
tions. The agreement expands the requirements of the 1994 GATT to
require WTO members to provide national treatment to imported products
and refrain from imposing quantitative restrictions, such as quotas, on the
19. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 44, 48.
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import or export of goods.20
The agreement applies solely to investment measures taken by WTO
members relating to trade in goods. It requires each member government
to refrain from applying trade related investment measures inconsistent
with GATT Articles III and XI. It also provides an illustrative list of TRIMs
deemed to be inconsistent with these articles:
- local content requirements,
- limiting imports or balancing imports and exports,
- limiting imports by restricting access to foreign exchange related to
earnings (foreign exchange balancing), and
- placing limits on an enterprise's exports.
The agreement provides for notification and phase out within two, five, and
seven years for developed, developing, and least developed countries
respectively. 2 1
D. NAFTA
NAFTA's Chapter Eleven provides for the most comprehensive treatment of
investment. It is the first investment agreement involving more than two
parties. Substantively, Chapter Eleven embraces and exceeds the provi-
sions embodied in the OECD Codes and the WTO provisions on TRIMs.
Among other things, it provides for an "investor-to-state" dispute settlement
procedure, bans a far more comprehensive list of performance require-
ments than the TRIMs, and provides for expropriation consistent with
international law and transfers of capital and profits. In sum, the invest-
ment chapter of NAFTA permits cross border investment to take place in
Mexico with far fewer government restrictions, and with no new restric-
tions in either Canada or the United States.2 2
From the perspective of an international investor, NAFTA rules on
investment were a quantum leap forward. The rules not only established a
floor under a number of measures Mexicans were liberalizing on their own
account, but also provided for new liberalizations and an investor-to-state
dispute settlement mechanism through binding arbitration. Prior to
NAFTA, investors had to settle their disputes within the Mexican court
system.2 3
To help ensure that the potential benefits of NAFTA were not dimin-
ished by an intrusive tax regime, NAFTA was accompanied by a bilateral
tax treaty between the United States and Mexico. The major function of
the companion tax treaty was to prevent discrimination, double taxation,
20. Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1995, annex 1A, to
the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negoti-
ations, 33 I.L.M. 125 (1994).
21. Id.
22. See Edward M. Graham & Christopher Wilkie, Multinationals and the Investment
Provisions of the NAFTA, 3 Iwr'TL TR aEJ. 9 passim (1994).
23. Unlike the dispute settlement procedures in trade, which permit for retaliation
in trade across sectors, the dispute settlement mechanism in investment permits the
right of private action and relies primarily on an award of money damages. Cross retali-
ation is not permitted.
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tax avoidance and evasion, and to lower and lock in Mexican and U.S. tax
rates. These treaty provisions serve to provide greater stability and cer-
tainty for investors.
Exceptions played an important role in this agreement. Like bilateral
investment treaties, the NAFTA investment provisions were also subject to a
number of exceptions. For example, Mexico excluded the petroleum sec-
tor,24 the United States excluded the maritime sector,25 and Canada con-
tinued its exclusion of cultural measures from the U.S.-Canadian Free
Trade Agreement. 26 Despite the absence of progress in opening these sec-
tors to foreign investment, progress was made in a broad sense insofar as
each government committed that certain exceptions would be subject to a
"standstill" or a "freeze." That is, exceptions could not be made any more
restrictive than they presently were (Annex I restrictions). Other restric-
tions (Annex II restrictions) remained open-ended and could be made
more restrictive. For example, the United States agreed that its exception to
national treatment for the Atomic Energy Act, the Mineral Lands Leasing
Act, and the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 would not be made more restric-
tive. However, open-ended exceptions for national treatment and MFN were
registered for other activities such as providing preferences for socially or
economically disadvantaged minorities and maritime services.27
UII. OECD vs. WTO
In the run-up to the launch of the negotiations, a vigorous debate took
place as to the appropriate forum for these negotiations. The European
Commission and Sir Leon Brittan argued strongly for the WTO on the
grounds that the "real" investment problems were in lesser developed coun-
tries (LDCs). As LDCs were members of the WTO and not the OECD, the
conclusion was drawn that the WTO was the appropriate forum. As Sir
Leon put it: "It is not realistic to expect the dynamic economies of Asia
and Latin America to sign up on a take-it or leave-it basis to an OECD book
of rules in whose compilation they have played no part. Hence the need for
the WTO to get involved. [sic]"2 8
This argument is intuitively compelling but misses several important
points. As pointed out by Graham and Wilkie,29 a WTO agreement on
investment would necessarily have to cover new areas beyond the compe-
tence that the WTO was granted (e.g., the right of establishment) to be
effective. Achieving this goal would go far beyond TRIMs and would, in
and of itself, require extensive negotiations; it would probably hamstring
the negotiations at the outset.
24. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Annex I-
VII, 32 IL.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at I-U-1 to 23, I-U-1 to 13.
28. Investment Pact Should Be Sought in Both OECD and Worldwide Basis, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 1996, at 1, 21.
29. See Graham & Wflkie, supra note 22, at 103.
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In contrast, the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, and other nations felt that the argument for holding the nego-
tiations in the OECD was more compelling. OECD negotiations would not
be constrained by any trade-related link. The shared experience of OECD
countries in advancing the OECD Codes, and their common view on
investment principles, offered a better chance for success.
Tactics were also a compelling factor in selecting the OECD as the
forum. OECD member countries were keenly aware of the successful
efforts by LDCs to water down the TRIMS negotiation and did not want to
ignite a "race to the bottom," which OECD members felt would ensue in
the WTO. So the strategy was to:
- negotiate a high standards agreement among OECD like-minded coun-
tries and clean up the remaining investment restrictions on their books;
- encourage like-minded LDCs that have liberalized their investment
regimes to accede to the agreement (e.g., outreach seminars and partici-
pation in the negotiations in an observer capacity have been
undertaken);
- when concluded, open the agreement to accession to non-OECD mem-
bers; and
- ultimately integrate the MAI disciplines into the WTO. The important
element here is that such an agreement would have high standards, pro-
vide for liberalization of investment restrictions, and have the signature
and support of a core group of like-minded developed and developing
countries. Ideally, the MAI would be concluded within its two-year
frame (May 1997), thereby creating the opportunity to integrate it into
the WTO Ministerial of 1999.
IV. Key Features of the MAI30
To realize the full potential of investment flows, the rules must be as com-
prehensive as possible:
- all laws, regulations and procedures should be transparent and avail-
able to the public;
- the rules should reach virtually every type of asset: plant inventory,
financial assets, intellectual property, etc. This definition reflects the
broad variety of potential corporate investment strategies.
- investors and their investments should be treated fairly and equitably
by governments with regard to local competitors when they go abroad to
establish and operate an enterprise. In technical terms, the MAI should
provide for national treatment (i.e., policy treatment that is no worse
than it is for domestic competitors to ensure a "level playing field").
- all foreign investors should be treated the same by the host government
(i.e., MFN treatment).
- investors should be free of discriminatory government- imposed costs.
For instance, it is unfairly burdensome to require a foreign investor to
purchase a certain quantity of inputs from local suppliers, to export a
30. See generally U.S. COUNCIL FOR IN'L hNv., supra note 6.
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certain portion of production, or to transfer certain technologies, etc.
These requirements generally do not apply to a domestic firm. They are
expensive for the foreign investor to implement and hurt suppliers in the
investor's home country, who would otherwise supply the investor in
the overseas market or secure the export to third markets on the basis of
their cost and quality.
- investors need the right to seek to minimize confiscatory and complex
tax regimes that can impede and distort investment decisions.
- investors need the flexibility to move key personnel and their families to
any of their facilities without incurring cumbersome immigration
requirements.
- MAI should have a provision on transfers to respond to market demands
and deploy financial resources quickly, flexibly, and to adjust them
when necessary.
- investors should have protection against arbitrary seizures by govern-
ments. MAI should contain a provision on expropriation consistent
with international legal standards. Takings should only be for a public
purpose, and there should be prompt, adequate, and effective compen-
sation for any such takings. From a U.S. perspective, this provision
should go no further than the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution,
which prohibits takings without due process of law and compensation.
- investors need the option of moving quickly and directly to challenge
discriminatory and arbitrary actions taken by governments on individ-
ual deals. MAI should provide for investor-to-state as well as state-to-
state binding dispute procedures.
- investors need to be assured that their investments will not be held hos-
tage to the host government that seeks to enforce its laws
extraterritorially.
Like the WTO, it is unrealistic to envisage an investment agreement
that compels a government to change its laws. An award of monetary dam-
ages should suffice to remind governments that they cannot violate the
terms of the agreement without penalty.
V. The Difficult Issues: Helms-Burton, Exceptions, Labor Standards,
Environmental Proposals
A. Helms-Burton
In March 1996, the U.S. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, bet-
ter known as Helms-Burton, became law.3 1 Title III of the act allows U.S.
citizens and corporations whose property was confiscated by the Cuban
government any time after January 1, 1959, to bring suits for damages in
U.S. courts against anyone who "traffics" in their former property at any
time after November 1, 1996.32 Title IV prohibits entry into the United
States by persons who traffic in confiscated property, as well as their fami-
31. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6021 (1996).
32. Id. § 6082.
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lies, after March 12, 1996. 33 The President has waived Title III provisions
every six months; there is no waiver authority for Title IV.34
The Helms-Burton Act created a fierce foreign policy conflict between
the United States, the European Union, and Canada for its extra-territorial
reach to enforce U.S. law. In October 1996, the EU filed a complaint
against the United States in the World Trade Organization (WTO). It
alleged that Helms-Burton violated the WTO by creating "extra-territorial"
means to achieve the law's objectives and the threat and imposition of trade
sanctions. Intensive diplomatic efforts ensued to persuade the EU not to
proceed with its case and on April 11, 1997, U.S. Under-Secretary of Com-
merce Stuart Eizenstat and Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan of the EU nego-
tiated an understanding to:
[d]evelop agreed disciplines and principles for the strengthening of invest-
ment protection, bilaterally and in the context of the Multilateral Agreement
on Investment. . . . [T]he standards of protection governing expropria-
tion... envisioned in the MAI should be respected by all States... [and
they] should inhibit and deter the future acquisition investments from any
State which has expropriated ... investments in contravention of interna-
tional law .... 35
The negotiators established a deadline of October 15, 1997, which was
later extended to May 1998. During the interim, the United States agreed
to continue its suspension of Title III and to seek from Congress a legisla-
tive waiver of Title IV. In turn, the EU agreed to suspend its challenge of
Helms-Burton in the WTO.36 The negotiations on Helms-Burton were
undertaken outside of the OECD negotiations on MAI. However, the EU
(and Canada) indicated to MAI negotiators, who would develop disciplines
on expropriation in their own right, that the MAI agreement could not be
concluded until such time as there was a successful resolution of the sepa-
rate negotiations on Helms-Burton.
An "Understanding" between the EU and the United States was
reached on May 18, 1998, whereby the two sides agreed on a set of disci-
plines for countries that have expropriated properties and for countries
with an established record of repeated expropriation, such as Cuba. 37 The
disciplines would also be introduced into the MAI. In addition, the United
States is obliged to provide a waiver of Title III without time limits and to
change the law to permit and implement a waiver of Title IV. These
changes will require legislative action.
In a unilateral statement on May 18, 1998, EU President Santer and
U.K. Prime Minister Blair made clear three conditions for entry into force
and EU adherence to the agreement: the United States must continue to
33. Id. § 6091.
34. Id. at § 6091(c).
35. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Understanding Between the United States and the Euro-
pean Union, NEws, Apr. 11, 1997.
36. Id.
37. The "Understanding" and accompanying statements are reprinted in INsIDE U.S.
TRADE, May 22, 1998, at 1, 21-30.
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waive Title III of Helms-Burton without time limit, the United States must
obtain and use waiver authority for Title IV from Congress, and the United
States must not take action against EU companies or individuals under the
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act.38
B. Exceptions: The General Issue
After two years of negotiations, OECD governments had nearly completed
a text providing a basic framework of rules. This is the "easy" part. The
next step is to identify and negotiate a reduction in the number of excep-
tions desired to a level that yields true liberalization and a balance of bene-
fits among negotiating countries. These two elements - reduction in
restrictions and a balance of benefits - are critical for the agreement to
achieve the requisite support.
As envisaged by the negotiators, 39 the only exceptions permitted
would be those listed when adhering to the agreement. These exceptions
would be subject to progressive liberalization and should produce a bal-
ance of commitments among the participants.
As matters unfolded, different approaches were proposed by negotia-
tors. One approach would enable a country to entirely "carve out" a sector
from the reach of the agreement. This gives rise to several difficulties.
Carve outs, by definition, lack the transparency required by investors. For-
eign investors can never be sure what is or is not included in the sector or
measure that is carved out. This leaves the possibility that governments
will impose new, restrictive measures in the sector that is carved out. Also,
sectors or measures that are carved out leave investors with no redress. If
the sector is not subject to the rules, one cannot invoke dispute settlement
procedures. Carve outs can also drive a negotiation to the lowest common
denominator. If, for example, two or three countries succeed in having a
sector or measure carved out, all countries are denied the ability to offer
the protections of the agreement to their foreign investors. Thus, a handful
of countries can easily diminish the value of an agreement by insisting on
carve outs.
A second approach is to have individual countries request exceptions
for specific measures and to have those measures clearly listed in the agree-
ment. This approach avoids many of the disadvantages of carve outs, since
it provides the transparency and clarity that investors require. Moreover,
the individual/country specific approach is selective. It limits exceptions
to those countries that truly need or want them for economic or political
reasons while permitting other countries to remain open to foreign invest-
ment in keeping with MAI rules.
A third approach, which has been used in OECD Codes, is "standstill
and rollback." This method is used with countries seeking OECD member-
ship and with existing members at periodic reviews. Simply stated, the
38. Id.
39. See OECD, REPORT BY THE CommrrrEE ON INTERNATIONAL INvEsTmENT AND MUL-
TINATIONAL ENTERPRISES TO THE COUNCIL OF MNmsTERs (1995).
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"standstill" provision commits countries to refrain from rendering their
investment rules any more restrictive than at the time of membership.
"Rollback," as the name implies, commits countries to reduce the level of
those restrictions, with some reduction taking place at the time a country
joins the OECD, and other reductions scheduled at a later date. An added
feature to this approach is the "ratchet": once a country liberalizes an
investment measure, the liberalization cannot be removed. Thus, liberaliza-
tion has an upward ratchet effect.
When Korea acceded to the OECD, it followed the principles of stand-
still and rollback. In addition to agreeing to a standstill, Korea agreed to
liberalize numerous investment measures. For example, it agreed to reduce
the ceiling on the total amount of domestic securities that can be issued
abroad and relax progressively existing ceilings on foreign portfolio invest-
ment in Korean stocks.40
In the MAI negotiations, it has been reported that most European
countries preferred the standstill/rollback approach because they had
experienced this approach in previous OECD negotiations. Several coun-
tries, however, objected. The United States, Mexico, and Canada pointed
out that standstill and rollback would conflict with the exceptions they
took in NAFTA, where they had agreed among themselves that certain
exceptions would be subject to standstill while others would remain open-
ended. Accepting the European approach that all investment laws be sub-
ject to standstill would upset the balance of benefits they achieved in
NAFTA, and arguably would impede their ability to obtain a balance of
benefits among all MAI parties. As a result, the United States, Canada, and
Mexico argued for a listing of all exceptions, followed by negotiations on
those exceptions to achieve a balance of benefits.
Can agreement be reached on an architecture for negotiating excep-
tions? Unfortunately, not much progress has been made in resolving the
issue. In early 1997, it became clear that the issue would not be resolved in
time to meet the target deadline of May 1997. Consequently, Ministers
extended the deadline to May 1998. But even with this extended period of
time, negotiators have not been able to fully address this important issue,
and it is not clear how or when it will be resolved.
VI. Country requests for exceptions
There is currently no publicly available list of exceptions requested by
country negotiators. But that information which has been gleaned through
conversations and articles in the press reveals the different approaches
countries are taking to exceptions.
A. Culture
It should come as no surprise that France and Canada would seek an
exception for culture. In article 2005 of the Canada-U.S. Free-Trade Agree-
40. Robert Ley & Pierre Poret, The New OECD Members and Liberalisation, OECD
OBSERVER, Apr. 14, 1997, at 38.
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ment, Canada exempted all cultural industries. 41 But Canada provided
transparency to this exemption by listing in article 2012 of the agreement
those activities it considered to be cultural, such as books, magazines,
video, music, print, and radio communications. 42
In the GATS, France, along with other members of the European Com-
munity, took an MFN exception for cultural activities to permit the EU and
its members to liberalize among themselves in cultural activities without
extending those liberalizations to non-EU countries. As required by WTO
rules, the Commission listed its cultural activities in the appropriate GATS
schedules of exceptions.43 In the MAI however, it is reported that France
and Canada seek a total carve out for culture with no listing of what would
or would not constitute cultural measures. A carve out of this nature
would thus go beyond the exceptions that already exist from previous
negotiations and allow any country the ability to introduce new discrimi-
natory "cultural" measures without accountability or redress by foreign
investors.
The desire for carve outs goes beyond culture. The European Union,
which will be a signatory to the MAI, seeks a carve out for Regional Eco-
nomic Integration Measures (REIOs). A REIO is an organization of sover-
eign States that have committed themselves to abolish, in substance, all
barriers to investment among themselves and have transferred competence
on the investment issue to the European Commission. The REIO excep-
tion, if granted, would enable the Commission to discriminate favorably
among its members. Third parties to the MAI would not receive the same
treatment as a REO member. In addition, prospective member states of
the Commission may seek REIO status even before they are actually admit-
ted to the European Union.44
There are several problems with the REID clause. As a general matter,
it introduces a measure of uncertainty and lack of transparency in invest-
ment rules that are designed to promote certainty and transparency. It
would extend provisions to countries that are not yet members of the EU
and may not become members for a considerable period of time, and it
assumes that non-EU members would accept new discriminatory measures
or measures of "preferential liberalization" without redress.
Privatization programs provide a good example of the dangers of pref-
erential liberalization. New opportunities for foreign investors will occur
under privatization programs in acceding states. Consistent with the
national treatment provision, this liberalization should apply to all MAI
countries, not only to ensure fairness, but to ensure that privatizing firms
41. See Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1989, 27 I.L.M. 281, 396 (1988).
42. Id. at 398.
43. European Commission, Final List of MFN Exceptions of the European Community
and its Member States, MTN.GNS/W/228/rev.1 (Dec. 15, 1993).
44. Directorate for Financial, Fiscal, and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, The Multilateral
Agreement on Investment: The MAI Negotiating Text (last modified Dec. 14, 1998) <http:/
/www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/maitext.pdf> [hereinafter MAI Negotiating Text].
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are given the opportunity to attract the most qualified buyer the market has
to offer.
B. Labor and Environment
More than a year into the negotiations, there was pressure from non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) to incorporate binding labor and environ-
ment provisions into the investment rules being negotiated. Concurrent
with this effort, these groups used the absence of such provisions as
grounds to oppose the agreement.
1. Labor
Binding labor standards should not be included in the MAI because it
would open the door to the use of economic sanctions to enforce labor
standards in business agreements. This is the same basis on which the
business community has consistently opposed the "social clause." The
social clause has long been the goal of U.S. and international labor move-
ments. Some governments, led recently by the United States and France,
have fought for the inclusion of a social clause in the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO). While these efforts are largely based on a genuine desire to
promote labor standards and workers' rights, they also lend themselves to
easy exploitation by those espousing protectionism.
A major impediment to dealing with labor issues in the MAI lies in the
definition of fundamental labor standards or workers' rights. While there
is perhaps general agreement on certain elements of such a definition,
once one moves beyond generalities, the details of what constitutes a core
labor standard vary depending on the social, cultural, and economic situa-
tion of the country in question. For example, the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and the Copenhagen Social Summit define core labor
standards as the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining,
non-discrimination and equal pay, and the prohibition of child labor and
forced labor.45 The NAFTA Labor Side Agreement, on the other hand,
mentions eleven labor "principles," three of which (child labor, minimum
wage, and safety and health) are so fundamental that infractions will lead
to penalties in the form of snap-back tariffs. 46
It is likely that the MAI rules will ultimately be incorporated into the
WTO. A MAI that incorporates the "social clause" is not likely to be
enshrined in the WTO. Changing the basic ground rules of the WTO/
GATT would require consensus from over 130 members, the overwhelming
majority of which would never agree to such a measure. Developing coun-
tries in particular regard the social clause as anathema. As they are already
WTO members under the pre-existing rules, such a fundamental change
would constitute, in effect, a retroactive entry fee into the world trading
45. Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, Mar. 12, 1995, UN World Sum-
mit for Social Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.166/9 (1995); International Labor Con-
ference, 86th Sess., Provisional Record of Proceedings 20A (1998).
46. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., Annex I, Labor Principles, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993).
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system. Moreover, because of the strong protectionist implications, incor-
porating binding labor standards into a trade regime would make the
regime itself highly unpredictable and arbitrary.
The same logic would apply to investment. Obviously, unpredictabil-
ity and arbitrariness are anathema to investment. Developing countries
would never join such a regime, and U.S. and international business would
not support it.
2. Environment
There has been no stronger opposition to the MAI than that emanating
from elements of the environmental community. Their opposition appears
to be based on several factors.
First, even though the negotiations are now reasonably open for public
sector comment, some environmentalists claim that the agreement was
being negotiated in secret for nearly two years, without any advance notice
or explanation of its goals or objectives to the public at large. Second,
many environmentalists hold the view that economic growth and environ-
mental protection are basically incompatible. Third, they believe the MAI
will inhibit state and local authorities from taking measures to protect the
environment (as well as health, safety and welfare) by the threat of foreign
investors forcing states to binding arbitration over such measures.47
All or virtually all international negotiations are "secret" in the sense
that the public does not sit at the negotiating table, approving or disapprov-
ing its government's negotiating tactics and positions. However, it is accu-
rate that the MAI negotiations were launched with little notice or
explanation to the public at large, other than the OECD Ministerial state-
ment of 1995. Started as a major policy initiative, there is not a very good
record of policy officials at the cabinet or sub-cabinet level in any OECD
government going before their constituencies - labor, environmentalists,
citizen groups, the business community - to explain the goals and objec-
tives of the MAI, why it was being undertaken, and the benefits to be
derived.
As a consequence, the NGO environmentalist community believes that
it was left for them to discover the MAI after nearly a year and a half of
negotiations. This infuriated them, led to charges of secret negotiations,
and poisoned the atmosphere for a rational debate.
Protection of the environment and economic growth are not incompat-
ible. As recently as January 1998, representatives of The World Business
Council for Sustainable Development indicated that the free flow of capital
can be a positive force in the pursuit of sustainable development:
- Agenda 21 adopted by the global community at the Rio Summit recog-
nized trade liberalization as a positive force for supporting the most envi-
ronmentally and economically efficient use of goods and resources and
47. See, e.g., Robert Stumberg, Sovereignty for Sale: The MAI, Testimony before the
House International Relations Committee, Sub-Committee on Economic Policy and
Trade (Mar. 5, 1998).
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hence for contributing to sustainable development. Investment liberaliza-
tion is a close relative of trade liberalization, and can be expected to pro-
duce a similar positive impact....
- The MAI will also likely produce a greater willingness to include leading
edge technologies with an investment... This aspect of the MAI is impor-
tant to promoting sustainable development, especially in developing
countries, through new environmental technologies as well as new indus-
trial and commercial products and technologies that leave a smaller envi-
ronmental footprint ....
- Foreign direct investment is already the leading contributor to develop-
ment in the developing countries. The MAI can help expand this engine
of growth, and multiply its impact in terms of sustainable development
by promoting the inclusion of new technologies in the investment. 48
On another front, Public Citizen, a NGO associated with Ralph Nader,
argues that the MAI's investor-to-state dispute settlement provision will
constrain states from passing laws and regulations to protect health, safety,
and the environment. 49 Public Citizen argues that the regulations may be
deemed a "taking" or expropriation under the rules of MAI due to the
reduction of value in a company's investment caused by environmental and
health regulations. For example, in the case of a foreign investment, an
investor could bring a state to arbitration under the MAI's investor to state
dispute settlement procedure, obtain a favorable finding, and oblige the
state to pay the investor money damages.5 0
There are several compelling arguments against this line of thought.
First, as in all treaties, the U.S. government, as the party to the MAI, would
have to answer for any alleged violations of the agreements, not a state or
local government. Second, the Supremacy Clause binds states to the terms
of all existing Treaties of the United States.5 ' Third, with regard to "tak-
ings," the MAI echoes the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution - that
there cannot be a taking without due process or just compensation. 52
As a practical matter, the MAI should pose no serious problems for
states to take measures to protect the health, safety, or environment of its
citizens as long these measures are non-discriminatory. This makes sense.
Consider the following hypothetical example. Two plants, one foreign-
owned, the other U.S.-owned, wish to establish a wood pulp facility on the
Columbia river in Washington state. The Washington state authorities
decide to raise the level of environmental protection to protect the Colum-
bia river from environmental degradation. How should they proceed?
Should there be one set of rules for the foreign-owned plant and another set
of rules for the U.S.-owned plant? Or should there be one set of rules for
48. Memorandum from the World Business Council for Sustainable Development to
Don Johnson, Secretary General of the OECD (Jan. 9, 1998) (on file with author).
49. Lori Wallach, MAI, Win, Lose, or Draw for the U.S.?, Testimony Before the House
Committee on International Relations, Sub-Committee on International Economic Pol-
icy and Trade (Mar. 5, 1998) (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/
mai/what%20is/testimony.htm>.
50. Id.
51. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
52. 1d amend. V.
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both plants, recognizing that what matters is not who owns the plant, but
the behavior that is practiced.
Clearly, the behavior should be more important than ownership. For
that reason, states should continue legislating and administering their
health, safety, and environmental programs on a non-discriminatory basis.
Beyond this general observation, it is important to recognize that any coun-
try may register an exception to the MAI rules to protect an ipso facto dis-
criminatory program (e.g., a minority preference program in the United
States).
With further reference to the so-called takings argument, the example
cited by Public Citizen boils down to whether normal functions of govern-
ment such as zoning, licensing procedures, and protecting the environ-
ment, are takings or expropriations.
Consider the views of Professor Ian Brownlie of Oxford University and
Professor L. Oppenheim of the University of Cambridge:
State measures, prima facie a lawful exercise of powers of government, may
affect foreign interests considerably without amounting to expropriation.
Thus foreign assets and their use may be subjected to taxation, trade restric-
tions involving licenses and quotas, or measures of devaluation. While spe-
cial facts may alter cases, in principle such measures are not unlawful and do
not constitute expropriation. If the state gives a public enterprise special
advantages, for example by direction that it charge nominal rates of freight,
the resulting defacto or quasi-monopoly is not an expropriation of the com-
petitors driven out of business.
5 3
Moving from theory to practice, it is instructive to note how institu-
tions who insure against expropriation treat this issue. The World Bank's
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) provides such insurance
to investors and defines what is and what is not expropriation in Article 11
of its charter:
(a) [T]he agency may guarantee eligible investments against a loss resulting
from one or more of the following types of risk ....
(ii) Expropriation and Similar Measures
any legislative action or administrative action or omission attributable to
the host government which has the effect of depriving the holder of a
guarantee of his ownership or control or, or a substantial benefit from,
his investment, with the exception on non-discriminatory measures of gen-
eral application which governments normally take for the purpose of regu-
lating economic activity in their territories.
5 4
Government negotiators struck a similar stance at the OECD high level
meeting on February 16, 1998. On this issue, they agreed that "the MAI
must not and will not undermine government authority to regulate for the
protection of health, safety, and the environment. There is also a consen-
sus that normal regulatory action, even when it affects the value of invest-
53. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAW 532 (4th ed. 1990)
(emphasis added).
54. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Oct. 11,
1985, ch. III, art. 11, (ii), T.I.A.S. No. 12089, 24 I.L.M. 1598 (emphasis added).
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ments, should not be considered an expropriation or 'taking' requiring
compensation."55
3. A Formula for Compromise?
In an attempt to conclude the debate on labor and environment provisions,
the Chairman of the MAI negotiating group Frans Engering proposed at
the March 1998 negotiating session to include the following elements:56
- Non-binding language in the preamble of the agreement: The preamble
seeks to formulate concisely the inter-relationship of investment (as an
engine of growth), sustainable development (as protection of the environ-
ment), and internationally recognized core labor standards.
- An affirmation of the right to regulate: This provision, drawn from
NAFTA, states that a party "may adopt, maintain or enforce any measure it
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a
manner sensitive to health, safety, or environmental concerns, provided
that the measures are consistent with the agreement [non-discrimination/
MFN]." 5 7
- Not lowering measures: This provision, also drawn from a NAFTA provi-
sion, states that a party shall not waive or derogate from its own domestic,
health, safety, environmental, or safety measures to attract an invest-
ment.58 Governments, however, must have the flexibility to adjust their
overall health, safety, environmental, or labor standards for reasons other
than attracting investment.
- Expropriation: "A party shall not expropriate an investment or take any
measure tantamount to an expropriation ... " The language is accompa-
nied by an interpretive note stating that
measures tantamount to expropriation ... reflect the fact that international
law requires compensation for an expropriatory taking without regard to the
label applied to it, even if title to the property is not taken. It does not estab-
lish a new requirement that parties pay compensation for losses which an
investor may incur through regulation, revenue-raising and other normal
activity undertaken by governments. 59
Presumably the government negotiators provided the new language to
assuage the concerns of environmentalists that an investor could use the
investor-to-state dispute settlement procedure against a state environmental
measure deemed to be "tantamount to an expropriation."
- Association of the Voluntary OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises
The Guidelines 60 constitute a voluntary set of recommendations to enter-
55. See Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat & Jeffrey Lang, U.S. Statement on
MAI, Feb. 17, 1998, reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 20, 1998, at 17.
56. The Engering proposals are reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 27, 1998, at 17-
19.
57. Id. at 18.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 1994.
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prises from OECD Governments to help insure that multinational enter-
prises "operat[e] in harmony with the policies of the countries where they
operate.' '6 1 The Guidelines cover a number of functional areas including
labor, environment, taxation, competition, science and technology, and
disclosure of information. The OECD established the Guidelines in 1976
and updates them periodically. The most recent revision of the Guidelines
took place in 1993. The OECD anticipates that the MAI Negotiating Group
will annex the Guidelines to the MAI in a manner that does not change
their voluntary nature.
Comment: This five point proposal remains on the table for further work
and analysis. A number of important details warrant close scrutiny. For
example, the "right to regulate" states that a government may take any mea-
sure to ensure that health and safety concerns are met. Should this lan-
guage be so broad? Or following the precedent of the WTO's
Phytosanitary Agreement, should such measures be subject to sound scien-
tific standards and be based on scientific evidence?62
Similarly, "not lowering measures" provision requires clarification.
On its face, the provision seems logical and acceptable: a country should
not violate its own laws to attract an investment from a foreign entity. How
will the issue be settled if a country does violate its own laws, or if a third
party merely asserts that a government has lowered its standards? Will
legal standing be granted to third parties to address these types of cases?
Will the dispute settlement procedure stop an investment until such time
as the issue can be resolved? How can this provision be modified to pre-
vent it from impeding the flow of international investment?
VII. The United States Says: "The MAI Is Not Ready for Our
Signature!"
By the fall of 1997, the basic framework on investment protection articles
was nearly completed but there was little progress on three key issues: U.S.
and EU negotiators were far apart on any solution to the Helms-Burton
legislation, an issue negotiated outside of the OECD but one that the
Europeans stated was a sine qua non for concluding the MAI; there was
little or no agreement on how to negotiate exceptions; and the environmen-
tal concerns were becoming highly contentious.
Concurrent with this state of affairs, labor and environmental groups
laid claim to victory in defeating the U.S. Administration's request for fast
track authority to negotiate trade agreements. Although the Administra-
tion's request did not include the MAI, the defeat of fast track and its com-
mitment to greater liberalization of markets provided further fuel for the
opponents to lobby against the MAI on radio talk shows and over the
internet.
61. Id. at 3.
62. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, annex 1A-4 to the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
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By the turn of the year, negotiators had only four months to conclude
a deal. The issue was forced by the deadline of the April OECD Ministerial.
Could the MAI Negotiating Group resolve the critical issues, including
Helms-Burton?
The United States said no! At a high level meeting of MAI negotiators
on February 16, 1998, U.S. policy officials elaborated that the fundamental
problem was that other countries were seeking broad exceptions to the
agreement (culture and REIOs) as well as specific country reservations that
would dilute the quality of the agreement. Further, the United States
stated that "it would be unrealistic to fully address the range of issues by
the April deadline. '63
Representing a European view, Frans Engering, Chairman of the nego-
tiating group, stated that the key issue was whether the United States had
the political will to finalize an agreement in the fact of an eroding consen-
sus for liberalization: "[ulp to now, I feel here in Washington that they are
so bogged down in problems that they cannot go on .... ',64 He suggested
that compromises could be found to limit somewhat the effects of an open-
ended exception for REIOs. He further stated that the MAI negotiating
group could resolve the cultural issue by mirroring the GATS exceptions
for audio-visual services in the MAI and that negotiations to liberalize
restrictions could be completed in a two-year time period, following the
conclusion of the MAI negotiations. While Engering's proposal for resolv-
ing the cultural issue is appealing, the overall package was not acceptable
to the United States. All reasonable people could agree on the idea of com-
promise on REIOs, but it lacked a detailed plan. What limits would the
Europeans place on their desire for open-ended REIO authority, and what
in return would the United States be willing to give up on open-ended
exceptions of their own to conclude the deal? Beyond REIO, the United
States rejected the Engering proposal to negotiate liberalization within two
years time on the grounds that without liberalization there would be little
to show for three years of effort. Moreover, with just 6-8 weeks before the
Ministerial, it was unrealistic to expect that negotiations on exceptions
could be conducted in a manner that would yield true liberalization and a
balance of benefits to all parties.
In a formal statement released to the press on February 17, 1998,
Under-Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat and Deputy U.S. Trade Represen-
tative Jeffrey Lang reiterated the U.S. goal to "[sleek a broad and effective
MAI that meets United States objectives .... [and that] it is very important
to achieve a high quality agreement .... "65 While acknowledging the sig-
nificant progress that was made on labor and environment, it was the
desire for broad exceptions by other countries that prevented the United
States from concluding the agreement before the April Ministerial. REIO
was stood out as a major loophole:
63. See INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 13, 1998, at 1.
64. Id. at 25.
65. Eizenstat & Lang, supra note 55, reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 20, 1998, at
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The proposal by the European community for an exception for a REIO raises
a number of concerns. The proposal strikes at the core of the non-discrimi-
nation principle fundamental to MAI. The exception would deny other par-
ties the benefits of liberalization which members of the EU provide
themselves and ... would allow member states to erect new barriers to our
firms as they harmonize their policies to new Community standards. 66
VIII. The OECD Ministerial
In the two month interval between the OECD high level meeting and the
Ministerial, advocacy groups in support of and opposed to the MAI acceler-
ated their efforts to influence the outcome of the Ministerial.
Labor and environmental NGOs both here and abroad "spread their
wildest fears about the secret [MAI] negotiations on the Internet .... -67
Before long, they were sending each other apocalyptic e-mail messages
about how the MAI was a transnational bill of rights for multinational com-
panies that would rob national governments of sovereignty. 68
The business community urged governments to conclude the agree-
ment. Writing to cabinet Secretaries and the U.S. Trade Representative, the
company heads of the major business organizations - The Business
Roundtable, The National Association of Manufacturers, The United States
Council for International Business, The United States Chamber of Com-
merce, The National Foreign Trade Council, The Emergency Committee for
American Trade, The Coalition of Service Industries, and the Pacific Basin
Economic Council - stated that an MAI with high standards "is clearly in
the national interest .... [because] foreign investments by U.S. companies
help to contribute to economic growth and sustain good paying jobs in the
United States."6 9 As for "exceptions," the CEOs said that: ". . . MAI must
not include exceptions that can be used in the future to justify open-ended
discrimination against'U.S. companies and their workers."70 The execu-
tives ".... urged the Administration .... to push forward with the OECD
negotiations and try to bring them to a successful conclusion as soon as
possible."7 1 Earlier in the year, the Business and Industry Advisory Com-
mittee to the OECD stated, "the international business commu-
nity.., supported it wholeheartedly;... [t]he Agreement... [would] serve
as a catalyst for increased economic growth and employment by giving
greater confidence to increase foreign direct investment flows."'72
Meanwhile, government changed their signals toward the MAI. What
started out as a straight-forward exercise in investment protection and lib-
eralization of restrictions now had other objectives. Testifying before Con-
gress on March 6, 1998, Assistant Secretary of State Alan Larson noted that
66. Id., reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 20, 1998, at 18.
67. Editorial, MoNTREmA GAzwrrE, May 1, 1998, at B2.
68. Id.
69. Letter is reprinted in INsIDE U.S. TRADE, Apr. 24, 1998, at 24.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. BIAC Statement on MAI, reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 23, 1998, at 6-7.
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"developing an international framework of foreign investment is not our
only objective .... Another primary objective is to ensure that the MAI
contributes to the achievement of our goal of fostering stronger global
efforts to protect the environment, to respect internationally recognized
core labor standards and to achieve sustainable development.''73 The
upshot of these divergent views was that OECD Ministers decided on a
"period of assessment and further consultation" between the negotiating
parties and with "interested parties in their societies .... ,,74 A communi-
qu set October 1998 as the date for the next negotiating session but there
was no mention of concluding the negotiations by a certain date.
With regard to labor and environmental issues, Ministers sent a signif-
icant acknowledgment to the NGOs, stating that the Ministers "need to
complete work on MAI disciplines ... which take[s] full account of eco-
nomic concerns and political, social and cultural sensitivities." Further,
"the MAI ... rules ... would not inhibit the normal non-discriminatory
exercise of regulatory powers by governments and such exercise of regula-
tory powers would not amount to expropriation."75
IX. Where Do We Go From Here?
There is no easy answer to the future of the MAI. After three years of nego-
tiations, much has been accomplished but much remains to be completed.
There is a good text, reflecting provisions of the most comprehensive bilat-
eral investment treaties and Chapter Eleven of NAFTA. Negotiators have
thus far been unable to reach agreement on a method to deal with and limit
exceptions. Further, the negotiating group must work out the details of
labor provisions and environmental issues. Notwithstanding the serious
challenge these factors pose, the author believes that countries should per-
severe and see the MAI to a successful conclusion:
- International investment flows, now at $350 billion a year will continue
to increase and serve as an engine of growth for developed and develop-
ing countries. The question is on what terms this investment will take
place: on a rule-based system that establishes transparency, clarity, and
freedom to compete on the basis of their offerings or on a system with
no rules that enables governments to protect domestic markets?
- A rule-based system for investment is already on the agenda for the Free
Trade Agreement of the Americas (scheduled to begin this fall) and the
WTO is undertaking extensive preparatory work that may lead to an
investment mandate in future trade negotiations. Negotiators should
view these competitive undertakings as an incentive to finish the job in
the OECD.
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- Helms-Burton, which had been a road block between the United States
and the EU from moving forward in the MAI, may now be less problem-
atic as a result of the U.S.-EU "Understanding." The "understanding"
must receive the tacit approval of Congress and necessary changes in
the legislation must take place in order to implement the agreement.
This will not be easy. The outlook for changing U.S. legislation in the
near future is not good and this will have adverse ramifications for the
conclusion of the MAI. Nevertheless, an opportunity now exists to take
what was once a major point of contention in our commercial relations
with Europe and use it as an important element of the MAI to establish
rules and disciplines on expropriated investments among the world's
major investors.
- Once criticized as a "rich man's agreement" because of its virtual exclu-
sion of participation by developing countries, the MAI can now be
recast as a powerful tool for LDCs in Asia to attract long term capital
back to the region by acceding to the MAI. Korea, an OECD member,
has been liberalizing its investment regime in the aftermath of its finan-
cial crisis, and Hong Kong and Singapore have also expressed interest in
acceding to the MAI. If these countries do accede, other countries in the
region will face the competitive challenge to establish sound investment
regimes and could choose to join as well.
This is an immense challenge that cannot be dismissed. The "invest-
ment issue" will not go away and the opportunities cannot be ignored. MAI
negotiators should conclude the agreement within the shortest time frame
possible.
To do so, they will need to build a public case for the benefits of inter-
national investment and for a new investment regime, challenging directly
those groups in the United States and abroad that are opposed to trade,
investment, and economic growth. Countries must decide whether they
are going to rise to this challenge or cede an effective veto over interna-
tional economic policy to groups opposed to globalization.
A reversal in the productive post-war trend towards open markets is a
distinct possibility unless governments exercise leadership in their dia-
logue with domestic constituencies. For better or worse, the MAI has
become a litmus test in a battle to decide the shape and direction of the
global economy as we enter the next century.

